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0. Introduction 
This report examines the experience with PPPs in Europe. It is presented in six sections: 
 
- Concept and definitions of PPPs 
- Overview of development of PPPs in Europe 
- EU laws and policies in relation to PPPs 
- Myths about PPPs 
- Evaluating PPPs – a framework covering cost of capital, construction costs, operating costs, 
transaction costs, and uncertainty 
- The lessons of the Metronet failure in the UK 
 
1.  Concept and definitions 
In the 1990s the phrase ‗public private partnerships‘ (‗PPPs‘)it was adopted by governments and institutions 
such as the EU as a ‗softer‘ alternative to the word ‗privatisation‘, as a euphemism: ―expressions such as 
―public – private partnerships‖ invite more people and organizations to join the debate and enable private 
organizations to get a market share of public service provision. ….It seems fair to say that a number of 
governments have tried to avoid using the terms ―privatization‖ and ―contracting out‖ in favour of speaking 
about partnerships.‖ 1 
 
At the same time a specific form of privatisation was developed to deal with limitations on public borrowing. 
This involved using a private company to borrow money, build a new hospital, school, road, etc, and then 
operate it over many years, recouping the investment and profit from payments over the whole period of 
operation. In the EU, in particular, these have become known specifically as PPPs. There are two forms of  
PPPs. Firstly, concession contracts, where the company gets paid by user charges – for example in water 
services, or toll roads. Secondly, contracts typical of the private finance initiative (PFI) in the UK, where the 
company gets payments from a public authority. Concessions can only be used where end-users are charged, 
whereas the second ‗PFI‘ type of PPP can be applied to almost any element of public service, thus expanding 
the potential scope enormously.  
 
This paper treats this as the ‗core‘ concept of a PPP, which can be defined quite precisely as: 
- a contract between government and a private company, under which: 
- the private company is required to finance and build an infrastructure asset (road, school, software, 
kitchen), and subsequently:  
- maintain the asset and, usually, operate some element of a public service, using the asset; 
- in return for which the company is paid over a number of years for the cost of construction and the 
operation of the service, either through charges paid by users, or by payments from the public authority, 
or a combination of both.  
Such contracts are also sometimes described as ‗Design, Build, Finance, Operate‘ (DBFO) or ‗Build, 
Operate, Transfer‘ (BOT) 
 
There is also a further meaning of PPP, which the European Commission has called an ‗institutional PPP‘. 
This is a joint venture company, providing a public service, which is partly owned by a public authority and 
partly owned by a private company or private investors. They may also have a contract with the municipality 
to provide a service – for example, in Italy, Hungary, the Czech republic and other countries some water 
operators are partly owned by the municipality, and partly by private companies, under contracts with the 
municipality to run the water services.  These joint ventures may operate public services without having had 
to compete for a formally tendered contract, especially where they originated as municipal companies, or 
where a service was ‗delegated‘ without tendering.  
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2. Overview  
2.1. Growth of PPPs 
Although the phrase PPPs was little used before the 1990s, concession contracts have been used for many 
centuries. They were often used in the 19th century to develop water, gas, and electricity systems which 
involved high capital expenditure. The principle was that the private company agreed to invest its own 
money, in return for which the state guaranteed a monopoly to the company on supplying that service in the 
area covered, and so the company could expect to get a return on its capital by charging users. The same 
principle was used for toll roads, bridges, railways, etc. Concessions were unable to deliver the required 
scale of investment for universal services at affordable rates, and so were generally replaced by public 
ownership.2 
 
Institutional PPPs have developed as a result of governments and regional or local authorities buying or 
selling shares in companies.  France developed the concept of the ‗societe d‘economie mixte‘ (SEM), which 
allowed municipalities to set up trading companies, as long as there was a private company also involved. In 
Germany, Italy and elsewhere municipalities established their own companies to operate utility services  
Many governments also developed partial (or total) shareholdings in manufacturing or service companies, 
with a fluid interchange between public and private ownership of companies in a number of sectors. The 
most significant recent trend has been due to municipal companies in Germany, Italy and elsewhere being 
partly or wholly sold to the private sector. 
 
Following the collapse of communism, joint public-private ventures were frequently used as a way of 
introducing private companies into public services, for example in water in Hungary and the Czech republic.  
 
The UK developed the use of PPPs under the heading of the private finance initiative (PFI) from the 1990s. 
This covers road and rail, hospitals, schools and other buildings. PPPs were also introduced in sectors which 
have not been privatised, such as water in Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
 
Other EU countries also began using PPPs, following the Maastricht treaty which limited public borrowing. 
The EU itself has encouraged the development of PPP units in all countries to facilitate the creation of PPPs. 
By 2006 most EU countries were using or planning to use PPPs. 
 
Other countries with similar policies introduced a range of similar measures. New Zealand, Australia and 
more recently Canada and the USA all began using PPPs in the strict sense as an element of privatisation 
policy. Donors, the development banks and multinational companies encouraged the spread of PPPs in 
developing countries from the 1990s. This was part of the general promotion of privatisation. The forms 
included concessions in water, IPPs in electricity, and toll roads. 
2.2. Trends in PPPs 
2.2.1. Relative importance of PPPs 
PPPs remain a small part of total public investment. The great majority is still carried using the conventional 
method of public sector finance, a separate construction contract, and services operated by directly employed 
staff or, in some cases, contractors under a simple outsourcing contract.  According to a global survey by 
Siemens, PPPs only account for about 4% of all public sector investment:  ―Loan financing is widely 
expected to remain the key financing instrument across Europe.‖3 Even in the UK, despite the scale of 
PFI/PPP operations, they have accounted only for about 10-15% of all public sector capital investment since 
1996, with the remainder being carried out through conventional forms of procurement.4  
2.2.2. Countries and sectors 
The value of all PPPs in Europe (excluding the UK) has risen sharply since 2004.  A total of €31.6 billion 
worth of PPP projects had been signed by the end of 2006, of which €23.6bn. were signed in 2004-2006. The 
growth has continued even more sharply: at the start of 2007 there was €67.6billion worth of projects in the 
process of procurement.  Italy is much the largest market with projects to the value of €30bn being procured; 
of this €21.3bn relates to transport (roads, bridges and metro), €2.6bn to water projects, and €2.0bn to 
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hospitals. Germany and Greece are the next largest countries for new PPPs in 2007, with €9.5bn and €6.3bn 
respectively. 5 
Table 1.  PPPs in Europe 
 
Source: IFSL (2008) 
 
In European countries as a whole, transport infrastructure accounts for 82% by value of all completed, 
current and projected PPPs; 4% was defence; 4% healthcare;  3% sports and leisure; 2% education; 2% waste 
and water. 6 
 
In the UK, over half of all the PFI/PPP projects are in health, education and local government - much higher 
than in other European countries. Over a 20 year period in the UK, 23.2% by value of PFI/PPP projects have 
been in the health sector, and 15.5% in education, 11.7% in accommodation/housing, 4.2% in waste and 
water, and 1.5% in other local government services.  The proportion in transport has dropped sharply, due to 
the failure and cancellation of the £5.5billion London Underground PPP. This  single failure represents 
nearly 10% of all PFI/PPP projects ever signed in the UK. (IFSL 2008). 
Table 2.  PPPs/PFI in UK 
 
Source: IFSL (2008) 
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2.3. Companies 
PPPs have opened a large and profitable new market for  many companies. The chart below shows a global 
index of the 75 largest companies investing in infrastructure, which accounts for the the largest proportion of  
PPPs, including water, energy, raods and rail. The value of shares in these companies increased by over 
250% in 6 years to the end of 2007 – while the global average for all major companies was under 100%.  
 
Chart A. Infrastructure companies: double average growth since 2001 
 
Source: Standard & Poor's 
 
A number of multinational companies have developed as multinational specialists in building and operating 
public infrastructure and services. These include companies with sectoral specialisms, e.g. in water and 
waste Suez, Veolia, and FCC; construction companies e.g. Hochtief and Bouygues; and a large number of 
banks and other financial institutions.  
 
In the UK a number of PFI projects have been sold on to new owners, with financial companies increasing 
their dominance:  ―by March 2006 40% of operational [PFI] projects had changed ownership and in 50% of 
the cases of changed ownership the debt had been refinanced as well. The consolidation of ownership 
continued, despite levels of return on secondary holdings down to around 7-8 %‖ 7 
 
The financial institutions which are buying infrastructure PPPs include a group of specialist private equity 
firms operating so-called infrastructure funds. The largest of these is the Australian bank Macquarie. The 
underlying attraction of the investment is a reliable flow of cash from essential services or government-
guaranteed payments,  but these funds also extract exceptional profits through the payment of fees to the 
groups themselves. A report by financial analysts in 2008 showed that infrastructure funds frequently pay 
dividends to investors and fees to the financial institutions greater than the total profits made by the 
companies in which they have invested.8 
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3. EU law and policies in relation to PPPs 
3.1. Introduction 
The rules, laws and policies of the EU have a significant effect on the use of PPPs. They can be divided into 
three main headings. 
 
- EU rules on government borrowing, which creates incentives for PPPs 
- European Commission policies of promoting and encouraging PPPs 
- procurement laws, which affect how PPPs have to be created 
 
3.2. EU fiscal rules and PPPs/PFI 
The limits on government borrowing imposed by EU, national and IMF policies is the strongest explanation 
for the growth in PPPs.  The EC itself commented in 2000 that interest in PPPs had grown: ―due to budgetary 
restrictions and a desire to limit the involvement of public authorities‖. 9 
 
The EU fiscal rules were introduced in 1996 as part of the Maastricht treaty, and forms part of what is known 
as the Stability and Growth Pact. The provisions are contained in the Consolidated Treaty and related 
documents: the relevant texts and references are set out in Annexe 1. The Maastricht treaty stated that 
―Member states shall avoid excessive government deficits‖, and that not having an excessive deficit was one 
of four convergence criteria for admission to European Monetary Union, and, later, adoption of the Euro. 
The ―reference values‖ used for determining the maximum acceptable limits were defined as:  
- ―3% for the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to GDP‖ and  
- ―60% for the ratio of government debt to GDP‖.  
 
These ratios cover the deficit and debts of ―central government, regional or local government and social 
security funds, to the exclusion of commercial operations‖. The EU definitions of general government  
include ―institutional units producing non-market services as their main activity‖, and so exclude public 
enterprises which operate commercially through charging for services.   
 
These definitions differ from those used by the UK or the IMF, both of which have included the borrowing 
of state-owned enterprises as part of general government borrowing. This difference creates different 
incentives. Under the EU rules there is no incentive to create PPPs as substitutes for investment by public 
enterprises, for example railways (where these remain in public ownership): borrowing by a state-owned 
railway would not be counted as general government borrowing anyway under the EU rules. 
 
The EU rules do create an incentive for PPPs in government operations which are not carried out through 
trading operations, such as many health and education services, because they shift borrowing for capital 
investment from the government to the private partner. The rules therefore create an incentive to choose PPP 
financing in these services as an alternative to government borrowing, as a way of minimising government 
deficit.  
 
Even here, however, there is an equal incentive for corporatisation. Transferring a government activity into a 
trading public enterprise also shifts the entity out of the general government category, and so reduces 
government borrowing in the same way as a PPP. And the EU rules make it equally attractive to create a 
‗PPP‘ with a partner which is a public enterprise, because that partner‘s borrowing and debts are also outside 
the general government as defined by the EU, and so it achieves the same effect as a PPP with a private 
company. This is why the Eurostat ruling (see below) describes the PPP partner simply as a ‗non-government 
unit‘, not as necessarily privately owned.  
3.3. EU promotion and funding of PPPs 
The European Commission has for many years pursued a policy of facilitating and encouraging PPPs. In 
2003 it argued that PPPs should be used to develop trans-European networks, and so proposed: ―to launch a 
major public consultation regarding the rapid development of various forms of PPP‖ 10; in 2004 it issued a 
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green paper on PPPs 11 which aimed: ―to facilitate the development of PPPs under conditions of effective 
competition and legal clarity‖.  12  The EC has now created the European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC), 
through which the EC and the EIB ―disseminate information and best practice for the benefit of Europe‘s 
public PPP task forces and provide policy and programme support in PPP procurement and management to 
its public sector membership‖.13 
 
For the private sector, PPPs are a way of exploiting not only government procurement expenditure but also 
the cheaper finance available through the public sector.  Apart from national and local governments, the EU 
itself  is a major source of such public expenditure and public finance.  
 
The private companies are well aware of the importance of this funding, as highlighted in a report by the 
consultancy/accountancy firm PWC in a 2005 report, which focussed on the value of: 
- projects co-financed by the EU development banks, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 14 
- direct EU public spending through finance for  the EU trans-European transport networks (TENs);  
- direct EU public spending through the EU Cohesion Fund, Structural Funds or ISPA 
 
As public banks guaranteed by the EU and member states, the EIB and EBRD can obtain the best interest 
rates available, which is a great advantage to the private companies financing PPPs. The EIB ―is one of the 
biggest funders of PPPs, in a variety of sectors, including water, health and education‖, and 15% of all its 
lending in 2006 was for PPPs in transport alone. 15  
Chart B. EIB funding for PPPs 
 
Source: Goldsmith 2006 
 
 
There is a problem over the compatibility of EU funds with PPPs.  EU rules make it difficult to allocate these 
funds to projects run by a private company, and so this acted as a disincentive for countries to use PPPs.  The 
EU Court of Auditors in 2007 noted that ―only a limited number of PPP-type projects have received EU 
grants…. like Athens' International Airport, the Vasco da Gama Bridge in Portugal, a few de-salting plants in 
Spain. …The Court raised observations about structural problems affecting the [Vasco da Gama Bridge] 
project, weaknesses in the revenue forecasts as well as excess in the total EU contribution.‖16 
 
The EC has devoted considerable energy to producing guidance on how to solve this problem. In 2003 a 
guide was issued on ―developing successful PPP projects in the candidate countries‖ so that they were 
compatible with the rules for providing accession funds, stating that ―The European Commission has an 
interest in promoting and developing PPPs within the framework of the grants it provides‖ 17, with a further 
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guide in 2004 intended to demonstrate that ―it is possible to successfully manage these constraints [of ISPA 
and cohesion fund rules] and integrate the needs of all parties‖.  18  
 
In 2006 the EC, the EIB and the EBRD created a new institution to deal with this, the Joint Assistance to 
Support Projects in the European Regions (JASPERS). Publicly financed, JASPERS offers free advice on 
constructing PPP projects in such a way as to enjoy the maximum possible support from further public 
finance in the form of the cohesion and structural funds of the EC: ―JASPERS will assist beneficiary 
countries (principally the new Member States and acceding countries of the EU) to prepare major 
infrastructure projects which will be assisted by the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds over the next 
budgetary planning period 2007-2013. All assistance will be offered free of charge. Assistance may be given 
to prepare individual projects or horizontal studies that cover more than one project or more than one 
country…Key areas for JASPERS include….Private public partnerships.‖ 19 According to the EBRD: ―The 
key priority of JASPERS is the preparation of PPPs to help ensure that they are compliant and compatible 
with necessary regulations.‖ (EBRD 2007) 
 
The EBRD has also criticised transition countries for not adopting laws more favourable for PPPs. The bank 
carried out a survey in 2005 and decided that many transition countries did not comply with ‗international 
standards‘ for concessions. One of these ‗standards‘ demands that the law should not require the use of a 
model concession agreement – despite the fact that this is regarded as an important protection for public 
authorities who lack the capacity to negotiate agreements from scratch. Another is that the country should 
always allow access to international arbitration – a condition which undermines national sovereignty and is 
expected to favour companies claiming compensation. Another is that the laws should provide for state 
guarantees for PPPs – despite the fact that such guarantees mean that the private company carries very little 
risk.  The EBRD rated 3 member states as ‗low compliance‘ with these international standards, 3 as 
‗medium‘: it also found that ―state financial support and guarantees rules were generally entirely omitted 
from the law or contained unnecessary restrictions.‖ Most transition countries have now introduced 
legislation for PPPs and concessions, except Hungary.20 
 
3.4. Fiscal discipline or PPPs?  
There is a dilemma for fiscal rule-makers, such as the EU and the IMF, between enforcement of fiscal 
discipline – which would involve making stricter conditions for PPPs being acceptable – and a desire to 
promote privatisation in general, which would imply making it easier to use PPPs.  
 
The EC has taken various different views on the relations between PPPs and fiscal discipline. The report on 
EMU in 2003 (produced before the Eurostat ruling) said: ―there is the risk that the recourse to PPPs is 
increasingly motivated instead by the purpose of putting capital spending outside government budgets, in 
order to bypass budgetary constraints. If this is the case, then it may happen that PPPs are carried out even 
when they are more costly than purely public investment.‖ (summary of part III, p.102) .21  
 
In October 2005, PPPs were again being treated as objects of suspicion:  
―Monetary affairs commissioner Joaquin Almunia accused national governments of using "tricks" to 
artificially cut budgetary deficits, as member states try to be seen to be following the eurozone's rules….  
He particularly referred to so-called Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), which share the financial burden 
of large infrastructure projects. According to Mr Almunia, it has become increasingly difficult for the 
EU executive, in charge of monitoring member states' budgetary performance, to look through such 
tendencies and figure out the real height of the countries' deficits. … The commissioner stressed that 
Europe should avoid the situation where public accounts imitate the creative accounting of some 
companies in the past.‖ 22 
 
As these statements suggest, there was a lack of clarity over the circumstances in which PPPs are officially 
recognised as being outside the categories of public borrowing and public assets and debts that are 
constrained by the EU rules. This matters because private companies want to minimise their risks, whereas 
governments have to argue that risk has been transferred to the private partner in order to justify treating the 
borrowing as private.  
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3.4.1. The Eurostat ruling 
The dilemma was solved, for supporters of PPPs, by a ruling by Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the EC, in 
February 2004, that the assets involved in a PPP should be classified as non-government assets, and therefore 
recorded off balance sheet for government, as long as (a) the private partner bears the construction risk, and 
(b) the private partner bears either availability or demand risk. 23 This is an easy requirement – availability 
risk simply means that the private sector accepts responsibility if its own asset stops working at a time when 
it is needed. All the demand risk – the risk of the asset becoming obsolete or unnecessary due to changes in 
technology, for example, can remain with the government. The Eurostat ruling thus made it easy to create 
PPPs which shifted the debt off the government‘s balance sheet without creating any major risks for the 
private partner.  
 
The IMF was unimpressed with this ruling, seeing this as an invitation to creative accounting to avoid the 
fiscal rules. In March 2004 it described the Eurostat decision as ―problematic‖ 24, declaring that the ―recent 
Eurostat decision on accounting for risk transfer gives considerable cause for concern , because it is likely to 
result in most PPPs being classified as private investment. …. Since most PPPs involve the private sector 
bearing construction and availability risk, they will probably be treated as private investment, even though 
the government bears substantial demand risk (e.g., when it guarantees to the private operator a minimum 
level of demand for the service provided through the PPP). …the recent decision …. thus could provide an 
incentive for EU governments to resort to PPPs mainly to circumvent the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
fiscal constraints.‖  25   
 
The ruling still leaves considerable uncertainty over the classification of PPPs. For example, it remains 
unclear how to account for contingent liabilities which governments may incur as a result of guarantees to 
PPPs. In 2007 the official review of EU finances commented that: ―the distinction between debt and this … 
definition of implicit liabilities is often a matter of convention rather than of substance. Some government 
obligations in relation to partnerships with the private sector, e.g. regular payments to private enterprises 
managing infrastructure, such as motorways, could also be considered in this … definition of implicit 
liabilities.‖26 
 
The uncertainty is such that Eurostat rulings on PPPs have had a serious impact on a major issue of 
macroeconomic policy, namely the entry into the Euro zone of member states who joined in 2004.  In 2005 
Hungary set up a motorway PPP scheme which it treated as private borrowing, which would have allowed 
the public finances to remain within the required limits for adopting the Euro; Eurostat however ruled that 
the scheme should be treated as increasing government debt, and so Hungary‘s accession to the Euro would 
be delayed.27 In 2008, Slovakia is waiting for Eurostat to make similar rulings in respect of state media 
companies, motorways, and public hospitals: again, the decisions could affect the date of adoption of the 
Euro in Slovakia. 28  The UK is experiencing similar uncertainty in relation to its PFI schemes, as the 
National Statistical Office reviews the classification of PFI schemes. 
 
3.4.2. International accounting uncertainty: IFRIC 12 
There is further uncertainty because international financial reporting standards (IFRS) now recommend that 
asset ownership in service concessions should be decided on the basis of effective control, not risk transfer, a 
recommendation enshrined in a note known as IFRIC 12.29 This expected to force governments to treat PPPs 
as public debts after all (although the European Commission has said that it should not affect current 
practices in accounting for PPPs ‗off balance sheet‘30). In Estonia, for example, ―international reporting 
standards may force local governments to put projects on balance sheet, which would make it impossible for 
the great majority of municipalities to carry them out.‖ 31 In the UK, it is generally expected that many or 
most PFI schemes will now appear as government debts: ―Under this, many PFI-funded assets will, for the 
first time, form part of NHS accounts, treated as if they were finance leases.‖ 32 ; ―IFRIC 12 makes it clear 
that PFI investments will not score on the private sector‘s balance sheet‖ 33.  
 
3.5. EU procurement law and PPPs  
EU procurement laws do not fit simply with PPPs.  There are three different categories. 
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Firstly, some PPPs are concessions, which are technically exempt from the procurement directives, although 
they are still subject to the competition and transparency rules of the treaty.34  The EC now proposes to issue 
a new communication. 
 
Secondly, many other PPPs, where the contractor is paid by the public authority, are not concessions. Since 
they are contracts, they must all be subject to competitive tendering under the procurement directives. This 
has created problems, as many PPPs were signed without any competition, and a number have been ruled 
illegal  as a result (see below).  
 
The third category is of companies which are jointly owned by public authorities and private shareholders, 
known as ‗institutional PPPs‘. A new communication has been issued on these, which effectively requires 
competitive tendering to create such a joint venture.  
 
3.5.1. EC guidelines on institutional PPPs 
In February 2008 the EC published its interpretative communication on institutional PPPs. 
-  Commission Interpretative Communication on the application of Community law on Public Procurement 
and Concessions to Institutionalised Public-Private Partnerships (IPPP) C(2007)6661 Brussels, 05.02.2008 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/ppp_en.htm  
 
Its overriding concern is not to clarify the status of publicly owned companies with a proportion of the shares 
held by a private investor, but to remove uncertainty that might deter the creation of IPPPs: ―The 
Communication aims at enhancing legal certainty and, in particular, assuaging repeatedly expressed concerns 
that applying Community law to the involvement of private partners into IPPP would make these 
arrangements unattractive or even impossible.‖ It is thus another instrument aimed at facilitating PPPs. (p.2) 
 
The communication defines IPPPs as involving a joint venture in which the private partner plays an active 
role in managing the activities: ―a cooperation between public and private parties involving the establishment 
of a mixed capital entity which performs public contracts or concessions.  The private input to the IPPP 
consists – apart from the contribution of capital or other assets – in the active participation in the operation of 
the contracts awarded to the public-private entity and/or the management of the public-private entity.‖ (p.2) 
 
The communication states that IPPPs must always be the subject of tendering, but that this needs only be 
done once: an IPPP can be created and awarded a package of work by a single act of tendering under public 
procurement rules.  It further states that IPPPs ―must remain within the scope of their initial object and can as 
a matter of principle not obtain any further public contracts or concessions‖ without competitive tendering. It 
remains possible for the terms of an IPPP to be varied without further tendering so that it can ―adjust to 
certain changes in the economic, legal or technical environment‖ – thus allowing re-negotiations of contracts 
to  
 
The communication notes the rulings that even a very small private minority holding can prevent an entity 
from being treated as an inhouse operation, but claims that this depends on the existence of an intention to 
open the capital of the entity to private parties. It even argues that there is ―theoretical possibility of a private 
party participating in the capital of a public authority's subsidiary‖ which might not affect inhouse status, and 
so that: ―simple capital injections made by private investors into publicly owned companies, do not 
constitute IPPPs.‖ (p.4, footnote 14; p.2) 
 
This communication allows the ECJ to continue to rule that even an operation which is wholly owned by a 
public authority may not be regarded as an inhouse operation if the ECJ considers it possible that the entity 
could at some future point be partly sold to a private partner. This in turn seriously undermines the 
theoretical right under the treaty for a public authority to choose an inhouse option without being forced to 
invite competitive tendering. Public authorities may be unwilling to work through wholly owned bodies 
without tendering, if they risk a court case which would results in a ruling that the entity has to compete for 
its work in any case.  
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3.5.2. Uncertainty over inhouse operations 
The EC may have made it easier to create IPPPs with confidence, but it has made it even harder to create or 
maintain inhouse entities. The relationship between procurement rules and inhouse operations remains 
unclear. A series of judgments by the ECJ concerning the inhouse exemption from competitive tendering has 
created great uncertainty, especially for corporatised ‗arms-length‘ entities.  
 
- The Arnhem judgment ruled that if there is competition from private companies to provide a service, 
then a municipally owned entity providing that service must be regarded as a commercial entity, not 
as a public law body pursuing public service objectives, and so could not be awarded contracts 
without open competitive tendering. 35  
- The Teckal judgment ruled that an organisation can only be assigned work without competitive 
tendering if  the  public authority exercises over it: ―a control which is similar to that which it 
exercises over its own  departments” – and if the ‘essential’ part of its work is for the public 
authority. 36 
- The Parking Brixen case ruled that an organisation could not be treated as an inhouse entity, even if 
it was 100% owned by the municipality, if there was a possibility that the municipality might sell 
some shares to a private investor and thus lose control 37 (the Stadt Halle case had already ruled that 
even a minority private shareholding makes it impossible for an entity to be treated as an inhouse 
operation38). 
 
The effect of these rulings is that public sector organisations are treated increasingly like private contractors 
or PPPs. It becomes increasingly difficult to make the policy choice to have an inhouse service rather than a 
PPP or private contractor. Public authorities are under pressure to invite tenders for all work, with their own 
public sector organisations treated as just one contractor amongst others. This recreates the ‗compulsory 
competitive tendering‘ which was introduced by the Thatcher government in the UK - but which was 
abolished in the UK over 10 years ago.   
 
This has been described as a ―conflict between the competition and internal market rules of the European 
Union and the rights and the room for manoeuvre of the member states and their subordinate territorial 
authorities in the area of public services‖. It is especially damaging in countries such as Germany where 
many local services are carried out by a large number of public sector organisations with various legal forms. 
These public sector companies are often legally barred from bidding for work outside their own locality, and 
are disadvantaged compared with commercial contractors, who are allowed to cross-subsidise within their 
own companies, and are able to form informal oligopolies to squeeze out public sector operators. 39  
 
3.5.3. Inter-municipal organisations and public-public partnerships 
The interpretation of procurement law by the ECJ has also damaged another widespread form of public 
sector cooperation. Inter-municipal organisations are common in Europe. They enable municipalities to 
cooperate and take advantage of economies of scale, for example in services such as water, waste 
management, or public transport.  They may take the form of a public authority to which the municipalities 
delegate powers, or of a company or a joint venture owned by the municipalities. 40  Other forms of 
collaboration between public authorities – sometimes called ‗public-public partnerships‘ - are also used as a 
way of improving efficiency through cooperation and shared resources.41  Public authorities have 
traditionally treated all such collaborative relations between themselves as a broader form of direct provision 
by the public sector, and therefore exempt from the need for competitive tendering.   
 
Successive decisions by the ECJ have threatened these practices. The EC in turn has taken proceedings in a 
number of cases against Spain, France, Germany and Italy, prompted by complaints from private contractors. 
Both the court cases and the EC proceedings argued that the provision of services by municipalities to such 
organisations, or vice versa, are contracts which should be subject to competitive tendering. 
 
- In Spain, the EC won a court ruling from the ECJ  that national laws could not exclude co-operation 
agreements between municipalities from the procurement directive‘s requirements for competitive 
tendering. 42 
- In France, the EC has stated that if a municipality provides services to an inter-municipal 
association, then this must be treated as a public contract and be opened up to competitive 
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tendering.43 The general code for local authorities has to be changed to prevent such arrangments 
without competitive tendering. 
- In Italy, the EC states that  a consortium of Italian muncipalities in the Ancona region cannot award 
a water and wastewater contract to a company jointly owned by the same municpalities without 
opening it for competitive tender. 44 
- In Germany, a group of 3 local authorities - Heidelberg , Mannheim and Rhine-Neckar - have 
cooperated in waste management for over 20 years by agreeing that each one will specialise in one 
aspect of the service, and all 3 authorities will use each other‘s resources for the appropriate service. 
The EC has ruled that all these contracts must be opened for competitive tender. 45 
 
There is a conflict between the approach behind these decisions and the public service policies of member 
states, which the Commission acknowledges: ―From a political point of view, the application of EC public 
procurement legislation to inter-communal cooperation might indirectly influence the incentives faced by 
local municipalities to engage in certain forms of cooperation, and hence raises a question of 
subsidiarity......In general, Member States do not consider the creation of inter-communal cooperation as an 
activity subject to tendering procedures. This however, does not completely match the position of the 
Commission..‖ 46  
 
The EC claims that ―tendering ensures that they get best value for their citizens‘ money‖, but such rulings 
and proceedings clearly prevent municipalities from having the flexibility to adopt the most efficient form of 
organisation in providing direct services.  Such flexibility is a major advantage of the public sector, and has 
been used to provide an efficient public sector service without incurring the transaction costs of tendering 
and contract management.   
 
The EC is insisting that the judgment of local democratically elected authorities must be subordinated to the 
central principle that competitive tendering is always best. The result is to actually deter authorities from the 
most efficient arrangements: ―whilst collaboration between local authorities or within the public sector may 
appear to be a sensible, practical cost effective way of delivering front line services, harnessing benefits of 
economies of scale, saving money and making the back office more efficient, public bodies will have to 
consider very carefully whether they need to comply with procurement law before simply entering into such 
arrangements with other like minded authorities.‖47  
 
4. Claims and myths about PPPs 
The central question about PPP proposals is whether they provide a way of financing  and running public 
services which is better for the public and the services. These issues are dealt  with in detail in section 5.  
 
But first it is necessary to deal with four claims made by supporters of PPPs, which are supposed to 
demonstrate their superiority without considering their impact on costs, efficiency, effectiveness, service 
provision and value for money.  These four key claims are: firstly, that there is no alternative to PPPs; 
secondly, that PPPs allow public money to be spent on other things; thirdly, that governments are relieved of 
risks, which are transferred to the private companies; and fourthly, that the private sector is intrinsically 
superior at delivering goods and services.  
4.1. ‘There is no alternative’ 
The first argument offered for PPPs is that ‗there is no alternative‘. Governments claim that, because of the 
constraints on government borrowing, and a reluctance to increase taxes or charges, projects such as new 
schools and hospitals could not go ahead at all without PPPs.  This argument is used to support the assertion 
that PPPs are necessary, and also to dismiss the need to show value for money - because there is no 
alternative with which they can be compared. 
 
Thus an evaluation of EIB loans to ten different PPPs across Europe ―found that the key impact of the PPP 
mechanism was that the projects were implemented at all. In all of the projects evaluated in-depth, public-
sector budgetary constraints meant that the alternative to a PPP project was no project, or at least no project 
within the foreseeable future, rather than a public-procurement project.‖ 48   
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But the ‗budgetary constraints‘ on government borrowing are political decisions, not set in stone. As the EIB 
evaluation notes, ―The extent to which government spending limits could have been adjusted to 
accommodate these projects [without using a PPP] can be debated...‖.   Many countries have even 
undertaken borrowing which breaches the Maastricht rules: in 2006, 8 out of the 13 countries using the Euro 
had a deficit greater than the rules allowed, even after adjusting for fluctuations in the economy. When five 
countries exceeded their deficits in 2003 to 2005, the EC was unable to impose sanctions, and had to revise 
its rules to allow for longer adjustment. All of the countries which have breached the limits on borrowing 
since 2002 still have government debt greater than 60% of GDP, which is the limit under EU rules. Breaches 
of the rules continue, and a recent analysis published by CESifo, a leading economics institute,expects that: 
―when difficulties arise again, we will see renewed attempts by governments to test the limits of the new 
Pact, or to change the rules, instead of making the necessary adjustments‖. 49 
 
The financial crisis of 2008 has now required governments to increase their spending and borrowing in order 
to support the financial sector and the economy in general, and the UK, for example, is formally revising its 
own rules on public sector borrowing, and other EU governments such as Ireland and France have said they 
will breach the EU rules.  The scale of the government support for banks alone is far greater than 
investments raised for public services through PPPs. The nationalisation of one failed bank in the UK 
(Northern Rock) in 2008 increased the UK national debt by £87billion  – a figure greater than the combined 
total value of all the PPPs and PFIs ever signed over the last 13 years in the UK (£60billion) and the whole 
of Europe (€32billion, equivalent to £26billion). 50   
 
Governments also constantly adjust taxes, and often increase them, even in periods of economic difficulty. 
For example, in September 2008 France increased taxes on capital by over 1%, generating €1.5billion  per 
year to fund a social initiative 51; the Netherlands passed a new law increasing taxes on hedge funds and on 
companies paying excessive bonuses to company directors, raising €60m per year ;52 Hungary was 
considering a new tax on energy companies, expected to raise €177million, as were other countries, 
including Slovakia and the UK 53. 
4.2. Saving public spending 
The second key assertion is that PPPs are better because somehow they do not cost the public, or the public 
sector, anything. This myth takes various forms: the idea that the public – or the public authorities – do not 
have to pay for schools or hospitals developed by PPPs; the idea that the government or municipality will 
have more money left to spend on other services; and the idea that PPPs mean a reduction in borrowing.   
 
But in PPPs like hospitals or schools,  the government pays for the cost of the PPP from taxation – by paying 
for the cost of construction, and then the cost of running the service. So PPPs are paid for by the public 
sector in just the same way as projects carried out directly by public authorities.  
 
The same applies to concessions where the PPP is financed by user charges. The cost of construction and 
operation are still paid by the users in the same way under a PPP as under direct public provision.  
 
In both cases, money is borrowed from the same financial institutions - banks, pension funds and other 
investors. PPPs do not open access to special ‗new‘ sources of finance. A PPP can spread the cost of a new 
building over many years, like any form of borrowing. But it does not reduce the overall cost of  e.g. 
building a hospital: it just spreads it into the future, and increases the cost because of the interest to be paid.  
 
Over the lifetime of a project, it is very likely that a PPP will involve higher public spending than a 
conventional project, because of the higher costs of capital (see below). So the alternative of a conventional 
public sector project with an inhouse service would probably involve less public spending overall.  
4.3. Risk transfer 
The notion of ‗risk transfer‘ plays an important role in justifying PPPs. Firstly, the transfer of risk is a key 
element in Eurtostat‘s definition of what borrowing falls off a government balance sheet. Secondly, it has 
been used, especially in the UK, to justify use of PPPs which could not demonstrate that they were better 
value than a public sector option.  
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But transferring risk is not free. It is possible to write contracts which transfer the risk of construction delays 
to the contractor, for example – but these contracts cost about 25% more than conventional contracts (see 
below). Nor is risk transfer necessarily the best policy option - this too needs to be evaluated against the 
benefits and costs of transferring a risk: it may not be worthwhile for the government to pay extra for such 
risk transfers. A recent theoretical analysis of risks and PPPs concluded that it is most efficient for demand 
risk to remain with governments, rather than the private sector, even if a PPP is used – and so it would be a 




The IMF has warned that governments may exaggerate the true value of risk transfer: ―it is also possible that 
the government overprices risk and overcompensates the private sector for taking it on, which would raise 
the cost of PPPs relative to direct public investment‖ 55.  This seems to have happened in the UK. The table 
shows how major hospital PFI projects looked worse value than the public sector option until an estimate of 
‗risk transfer‘ was introduced.  But no attempt is made to monitor if this risk transfer happens in reality, or 
how much benefit it really brings – out of 622 PFI contracts signed up to 2007, only 10 had been audited by 
the National Audit Office, and only 3 of these had examined the value of the risk transfer achieved.56   




option   
PFI/PPP 



















Carlisle hospitals 151.1 21.8 167 0 +10.5% -3.4% 
North Durham 157.3 23.6 173.9 3.1 +10.6% -2.2% 
South Buckinghamshire 161.6 7.6 163.3 -1.7 +1.1% -4.5% 
Norfolk and Norwich 1598.2 83.7 1634.3 8 +2.3% -2.4% 
Dartford and Gravesham 900.1 43.8 921.1 1.4 +2.3% -2.3% 
Source: Froud 2003 57 
4.4. The superior performance of the private sector 
The final claim is that the private sector is more efficient in all areas than government and public sector  
employees. It is assumed that private companies can finance investment more cheaply and easily, and 
operate a service more efficiently, than the public sector.  
 
These assumptions are false. It is not true that the private sector does or could borrow money for investment 
more cheaply than the government. The opposite is true, in almost every country in the world: governments 
can borrow money more cheaply, at lower rates of interest, than the private sector. And empirical evidence 
shows that the private sector is not overall more efficient than the public sector. Both these points are 
addressed in greater detail in the following sections 
 
Nor are PPPs particularly successful at financing capital expenditure for the infrastructure of essential 
services.  A World Bank research paper in 2006, reviewing actual private investment in a 22 year period 
from 1983 to 2004, concluded bluntly that: ―PPI [private participation in infrastructure] has disappointed - 
playing a far less significant role in financing infrastructure in cities than was hoped for, and which might be 
expected given the attention it has received and continues to receive in strategies to mobilize financing for 
infrastructure…PPI is inherently limited in scope for financing urban infrastructure for the wide array of 
non-commercial infrastructure services cities need. Even for commercial services like water supply, 
subsidies are prevalent all over the world…Local governments need good sources of public finance to fund 





In all cases, the expenditure of public money needs to be justified by expected improvements in the general 
economic and/or social well-being of the country or region. In terms of public policy, no PPP can ever be 
justified only by reference to the profits made by the private company. 58 
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5. Evaluating PPP proposals 
This section sets out a framework for evaluating whether any PPPs is preferable to a ‗conventional‘ public 
sector approach. In every case – contrary to the claim discussed in the previous section – there is such a 
public sector alternative based on the government or municipality borrowing money (or raising taxes, or 
making a profit); issuing a conventional contract for constructing the desired hospital, school, road etc., and 
then operating it by directly employed staff. Under this alternative, the costs to the public are the cost of 
repaying the public sector loan, with interest, and the cost of employing staff and buying necessary 
equipment.   
5.1. Public sector comparator 
The evaluation of a PPP must therefore always be a comparative exercise. As the  IMF insists: ―When 
considering the PPP option, the government has to compare the cost of public investment and government 
provision of services with the cost of services provided by a PPP‖ 59 In practice, PPPs rarely carry out such a 
comparison – and therefore fail to demonstrate that they are better value for money.  Sometimes a 
comparison is made using a notional ‗public sector comparator‘, rather than a real public sector alternative 
proposal, but public auditors in the Netherlands and elsewhere have questioned whether such comparators 
are adequate.60 A real comparison is important to avoid the use of PPPs simply as a way of moving 
borrowing off the public sector balance sheet, even when they are more costly. 61  
 
Most PPP assessments, however, only consider whether the PPP is economically feasible for a private 
consortium.  
 
For example, a state audit office report in Estonia has said that Estonian public authorities do not use proper 
public sector comparators in assessing the relative attractions of PPPs. The consequences of a PPP have been 
assessed ―by primitive investment accounting, measuring the benefits in terms of cost savings and profits‖.  
As a result ―non-transparent, costly and unfavourable contracts‖ have been signed.  These contracts have 
included inflated costs, due to excessive profit margins, risk premia, or depreciation allowances. Proper 
evaluations would have led to many PPPs being rejected: studies in Estonia have shown that long-term PPPs 
cost 25% more than public ownership. In addition to an accurate assessment of relative costs, a full public 
sector comparator needs also to assess the impact of a PPP on the mission and objectives of the public 
service, the economic effects – for example on employment, or the fiscal impact on public authorities – and 
the relative willingness to pay of citizens.  There are multiple public interest objectives which need to be 
taken into account: a purely commercial comparator is not sufficient for this.62 
  
The same problems have been highlighted in a new report on PPPs in the health sector in Italy. The report 
found that ―Italian health-care trusts…. neither drew up any calculation for weighting their future costs and 
revenues related to the project, nor did they consider the social consequences for the community. They 
merely followed the legal requirements and prepared a financial plan from the private partner perspective.  In 
deciding to create a PPP it is expected that public authorities would make the decision by reference to criteria 
of public benefit and by evaluating alternative ways of delivering the expected produce. The methodologies 
actually adopted e.g. in Italian healthcare PPPs, focus almost exclusively on the private sector perspective, 
namely ensuring that the PPP is structured in a way that makes it most likely to be financed at good (low) 
interest rates by banks. Limits on public borrowing constrain the possible alternatives, and in some sectors a 
small number of companies may have close relationships with each other and public authorities that make 
competition between private companies less likely. 63 
5.2. Framework for evaluating PPPs 
The framework proposed here is a simple one, based on the economic elements of a PPP – finance, 
construction, and operation, and the contract itself. The first heading of evaluation is to compare the costs of 
capital finance for the PPP proposal and for the public sector alternative; the second is to compare the cost of 
construction; the third is the comparative efficiency of operation; the fourth looks at the comparative costs 
associated with setting up and monitoring a PPP contract; the fifth compares the uncertainties involved in 
such contracts.   
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This framework is similar to the Ryrie rules which existed in the UK, even under the Thatcher government, 
which required a straightforward comparison to demonstrate the superiority of a private finance option.  No 
private investment project ever met these criteria – and so the the private finance initiative (PFI) was 
invented, with new rules giving  an advantage to the private sector. 64 It also reflects the recommendations of 
the Estonian audit report (see 5.1, above) which recommended evaluations taking account of the range of 
public interests and objectives.  
 
These comparative evaluations should be carried out on any PPP proposal before it is implemented. If the 
result is that the PPP looks like a worse option, then the public sector alternative should be preferred. The 
following subsections present some of the general evidence available on these comparisons.  
 
Table 4.  Framework for evaluating PPP proposals against public sector alternative 
   Evidence Note 
1 Cost of capital Interest + dividends PPP more expensive Private sector has to pay higher 
interest rates than government 
2 Cost of construction  PPP more expensive 
but less overruns 
Higher cost of ‗turnkey‘ projects, 
offset by saving on cost of overruns 
3 Cost of operation Efficiency Neutral Empirical evidence suggests no 
significant difference 
4 Transaction costs Preparation and 
tendering 
PPP more expensive Costs of preparing contracts and 
tenders 
  Monitoring PPP more expensive Costs of monitoring and supervising 
contractors 
5 Uncertainty Renegotiation and 
contingent liabilities 
PPP more risky Future renegotiations and changes 
5.3. Cost of capital 
Governments can nearly always borrow money more cheaply than private companies or private individuals. 
This is because there is very little risk of defaults. Governments are always there, with large tax revenues; 
whereas no private company is immune from the risk of going bankrupt.   Lending to private companies is 
therefore more risky, and so the interest rate is higher. The highest risk of all is attached to shareholders‘ 
investments in companies – known as ‗equity‘ – because if a company fails the shareholders are the last to be 
repaid. As a result, shareholders expect the highest return on their capital, through dividend payments.  
This can be seen in any empirical study of comparative costs of capital finance. For example, a study of PFI 
projects in the UK, carried out by PricewaterhouseCoopers, found that the average cost of  private capital in 
the PFI schemes was 7%, whereas the cost of capital for buildings directly owned by the NHS was only 
3.5%.  65  A detailed study of the cost of capital in the UK over the whole the 20th century, concluded that the 
long-term average cost of private equity is around 5.5%-7.5%, whereas the ‗risk-free‘ rate (typically of 
government bonds) is about 2.5%.66  These figures are broadly in line with other estimates.67 In the USA, 
public sector borrowing costs 35% less than private borrowing. 68  
 
This means that any PPP always starts with a handicap of higher costs of capital – which can only be offset 
by lower operating costs, i.e. greater efficiency: a fundamental point noted by the OECD, the IMF, and the 
leading FT commentator on globalisation, amongst others.  
 
OECD 2008 3.2.1 Box 7 – Efficiency gains and differences in public and private sector interest rates 
―….Though the private partner may have improved efficiency, the cost of capital of the private partner is 
usually higher than that of government, i.e. the interest rate on private sector loans usually exceed the interest 
rate on public sector loans. Thus, for the net benefit of a PPP to exceed the net benefit of traditional 
procurement, the efficiency gain of the private sector must exceed the additional interest cost that private 
partner pays compared to what government would pay in the case of traditional procurement. If the 
efficiency gain falls short of the additional interest cost, the minimum unit price at which the private partner 
can deliver the service will not be lower than the price government will pay in the case of traditional 
procurement.‖69 
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IMF 2004 para 22. ―…. The government‘s power to tax reduces the likelihood that it will default on its 
debt, and the private sector is therefore prepared to lend to the government at close to the risk-free interest 
rate to finance risky projects. This being the case, when PPPs result in private borrowing being substituted 
for government borrowing, financing costs will in most cases rise even if project risk is lower in the private 
sector. Then the key issue is whether PPPs result in efficiency gains that more than offset higher private 
sector borrowing costs.‖ 70 
 
Martin Wolf, Financial Times, 12 June 2008-06-19 ―….it seems obvious that the finance of assets is a 
suitable function for the public sector, which has one huge advantage - the ability to borrow cheaply. The 
difference between public finance of the assets and debt finance of a privately owned regulatory asset base, 
whose service is guaranteed by charges on customers set by a publicly appointed regulator, is, to put it 
mildly, not obvious. The most sensible solution would have been for the public sector to finance the 
assets….‖ 
5.4. Construction costs 
It is frequently argued that the construction stage of PPP projects is invariably completed on time and within 
budget, and that this is a crucial advantage of PPPs over conventional public sector projects. The UK 
government claims that 76% of PFI projects are completed on time, compared with only about 30% of 
traditionally procured projects, A review  of EIB funded PPPs across Europe also found that the projects 
evaluated ―were largely completed on-time, on-budget and to specification.‖ 71 
 
But the construction element of PPP projects is much more expensive. An EIB report compared the cost of  
PPP road projects across Europe with conventionally procured road projects, and found that the PPPs were 
on average 24% more expensive than the public sector roads. 72 In 2007 the Polish government cancelled a 
motorway PPP for exactly this reason: they realised that the  A1 Motorway from Grudziadz-Torun  could be 
built for about €5.6m. per kilometre using conventional procurement, compared with €7.4m. per km. using 
the PPP. 73 The EIB report also notes that this premium of 24% is about the same as estimates of cost 
overruns on public procurement projects, and so the extra cost of PPP projects reflects the payment required 
by the contractor to accept construction risk.  
 
This is achieved by ―the use of fixed-price, fixed-term turnkey construction contracts‖ which make the 
building contractors responsible for any delays: it reflects. The certainty of completion is achieved as a 
result of the contractor accepting responsibility for a wider range of risks, and contractors have to be paid 
more for doing this.  
 
Why are turnkey contracts used in PPP projects when they are rarely used in conventional public sector 
projects?  74The key reason is not because governments have decided it is worth paying more for higher 
standards of punctuality for public service infrastructure, but for the benefit of the PPP financier. As the 
International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) notes: ―Among such [turnkey] projects can be 
found many projects financed by private funds, where the lenders require greater certainty about a project‘s 
costs…. Often the construction project  is only one part of a complicated commercial venture, and financial 
or other failure of this construction project will jeopardize the whole venture.‖ 75  The private financier in a 
PPP project requires greater certainty about completion date, because the returns on investment only begin 
when the building is completed. And so the financiers benefit from the certainty of turnkey projects - but it 
is the public authority which has to pay extra for this certainty. 
 
One other reason for using turnkey contracts is the Eurostat ruling which states that it is essential to transfer 
construction risk for it to be possible to classify the debt as private – off the government‘s balance sheet. 
This risk thus has to be transferred, despite the extra cost, 
 
5.5. Efficiency 
As noted in the section on costs of finance, the private sector has to demonstrate greater efficiency – not just 
in theory, but sufficiently large and certain to offset the large and certain extra cost of private capital.  
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Empirical evidence form a number of studies shows no such pattern however – public operators are as likely 
to be more efficient as private operators.  So in evaluating PPPs there cannot be any general assumption of 
superior private sector efficiency – the assumption should be of neutrality.  
 
The evidence comes from a range of economic studies in public service sectors. A global review of empirical 
evidence on efficiency of public and private utilities in 2005 by the World Bank concluded: ―For utilities, it 
seems that in general ownership often does not matter as much as sometimes argued. Most cross-country 
papers on utilities find no statistically significant difference in efficiency scores between public and private 
providers. As for the country specific papers, some do find differences in performance over time but these 
differences tend to matter much less than a number of other variables.‖ 76  Some studies found that the public 
sector was much more efficient: an early study in the USA in the 1970s found that private electricity 
companies had consistently higher costs, and that private firms charge higher prices. 77   
 
Studies in other sectors also find that there is no systematic efficiency difference. A study of cities with 
different types of bus operators found that the most efficient cities were equally likely to be public or private 
(Pina and Torres 2006). 78  Even in telecoms, a sector where the private sector is assumed to be performing 
better than the public sector could, , a global study comparing private and public companies found that there 
was indeed ―efficiency growth following privatizations‖ - but ―it is significantly smaller than growth in 
public sectors.‖ (Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Stiglitz 2006)79  
 
The same results emerge from studies of PPPs in the UK. A study of the use of PPPs in defence  in the UK 
concluded that PPPs do not necessarily lead to  efficiency gains and that there are significant costs and 
disadvantages: ―The conclusion of the analysis is that the use of PPPs will not necessarily lead to improved 
economic efficiency in defence procurement and that considerable care will need to be taken both in terms of 
negotiating PPPs, monitoring their performance, and in their renewal. The UK defence sector illustrates that 
PPPs involve significant transaction costs which must be set against any benefits in terms of economic 
efficiency incentives‖80.  A similar result emerged from a study of PPPs in the health and municipal services 
sectors in the UK: ―a vicious circle of monitoring and distrust between partner organizations, in place of the 
old faith in bureaucratic process‖. The study also concluded that PPPs  present a significant threat to the 
‗public service ethos‘. 81   Demoralisation and inefficiency were also observed in a study of a UK hospital 
with a PFI scheme, where non-clinical staff were subject to four different sets of employment conditions - 
national, local trust, conditions created by a private contractor following competitive tendering, and new 
conditions of the private PFI contractor. This created problems and animosity, with some staff receiving shift 
premia for weekend work, and others receiving none. Changes in working practices also had a destabilising 
effect. For example, the churn of catering staff rose from 10-15% per annum to over 100% following the 
PFI, largely due to a change from cooking in kitchens to distribution of pre-cooked meals. (Earnshaw and 
Ellis 2004). 
5.6. Transaction costs 
PPPs do not create themselves or monitor themselves. There are costs involved in setting them up, 
negotiating and renegotiating the details, and the monitoring and liaison between the public authority and 
private company, including legal processes.  These ‗transaction costs‘ are a key reason why it is often more 
efficient for public and private organisations to do things themselves, inhouse, rather than contract an outside 
specialist to do so. PPPs are much more complicated than ordinary contracts, and so the transaction costs are 
expected to be higher. 
 
An EIB study of roads in central and eastern Europe found that roads built under traditional public sector 
methods were btter on all counts, with transaction costs especially significant for the comparative costs: 
―traditionally procured highway projects outperformed PPPs on three counts: traditionally procured projects 
were often implemented faster than PPPs; they were less costly when all costs, notably transaction costs, 
were accounted for; and they resulted in lower distortions of modal and route choice, largely because toll-
free, traditionally procured highways did not, by definition, divert traffic to other (toll-free) roads.‖ 82 
 
There is some evidence of the scale of these costs. A study by EIB researchers of transaction costs in 55 PFI 
projects and 32 EIB projects found that the procurement costs averaged over 10% of the total value of  each 
PPP contract. 83  The UK National Audit Office (NAO) estimated that the procurement costs for the Metronet 
PFI represented only 2.8% of the project value – but the project itself was so costly, these procurement costs 
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amounted to £455million. 84     On monitoring, evidence from the USA suggests that monitoring the 
performance of the private sector partner in PPP type of arrangements entails extra costs of between 3 
and 25 percent of the contract value. As a consequence, it is recommended in the USA that monitoring 
costs of 10 percent of the contract value be budgeted in such arrangements.85 
 
If the EIB and the USA data are combined, then the total transaction costs for PPP projects could average 
over 20% of the total project value.  
 
5.7. Uncertainty 
A PPP contract, like other contracts, are imperfect (or ‗incomplete‘). They cannot cover all the unknown 
circumstances and possible problems with delivery of service – especially over 25 to 30 years, a common 
lifetime for a PPP contract.  Renegotiations and changes are certain, but their content and consequences are 
uncertain. The private partner may exploit a monopoly service to the detriment of the people it should be 
serving.  The contractor might fail to perform satisfactorily, or abandon the contract because it is not 
profitable enough, or go bankrupt. Governments ultimately take responsibility for maintaining the service 
and repaying bankers, whatever happens to the private partner – these ‗contingent liabilities‘ may never 
happen, but they are expensive when they do. The contract itself is uncertain – it may turn out to have been 
illegal or corrupt in some way, with possible expensive consequences for the authority – and the public – at a 
later stage.  
 
These problems do not arise only because of the limits of forecasting, or human error. Companies have 
vested interest in exaggerating demand in order to get a project approved, or to compete successfully for a 
contract, especially a long-term one. For example, private companies systematically underestimate the costs 
of the investments, and exaggerate the expected demand for the service. A global study found that in 90% of 
road and rail projects, the actual costs end up significantly higher than forecasts in the original bid, and the 
actual demand is lower than the exaggerated forecast. This happens so consistently that it can only be the 
result of systematic misrepresentation – i.e. lying.. The authors concluded that: ―The problem of 
misinformation is an issue of power and profit and must be dealt with as such, using the mechanisms of 
transparency and accountability.‖ 86 
 
5.7.1. Renegotiations 
Renegotiations are nearly always to the benefit of the private contractor, at the expense of the public – 
allowing higher prices or lower investments. 87  In one year in the UK, 2006, changes were made to PFI 
contracts costing a total of about £180million – and the companies charged an extra £6 million to make these 
changes. 88  It is hard to ‗learn‘ from such problems. The Czech Republic signed a PPP contract to develop a 
new motorway to Ostrava: in 2002, it was cancelled. An enquiry decided that there needed to be better 
coordination, a special PPP task force was set up. Then in 2006, two more major PPP contracts were 
cancelled - for the €22m. Na Homolce Hospital and an €89m. campus for UJEP university. A report was 
again produced in 2007, recommending greater standardisation and better ‗due diligence‘. And so in 2008 
the Czech government is still going ahead with plans for PPP projects - including a motorway, a prison, a 
court building and a hospital that total over €500 million euros.  89 
 
5.7.2. Monopoly 
One form of abuse of a PPP is when monopoly concessions are used to overcharge customers. This is a well 
known problem with monopolies, but there is some recent empirical  from the water sector in France which 
makes it possible to quantify this. A comprehensive study of water PPPs in France, where about three-
quarters of the service is delivered by the private sector through PPPs, found that in 2004, after making 
allowance for all other factors, the price of water under PPPs is 16.6% higher than in places where 
muncipalities provide the service..90   
Chart C. Price of household water in France, 2004 
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5.7.3. PPP contracts annulled 
Partly because PPPs are often so large, there are often very few bidders, which weakens the competitiveness 
which is expected to be the key advantage of inviting tenders from private companies. A number of PPPs 
have been ruled invalid because they breached basic competition rules, and even involved clear corruption. 
 
5.7.3.1. Denmark: scandal in Farum 
The mayor of the municipality of Farum, a small town in Denmark, was committed to radical use of private 
contractors and PPPs. This included contracting-out of day care to ISS Servisystem, which led to a storm of 
complaints from parents and the termination of the contracts in 2001. The mayor also set up three 
construction projects on a PPP basis, including a sports stadium and a marina, negotiated with the same 
financial group. The deals were opposed on economic grounds by citizens‘ groups and even by the business 
press – one business magazine editorial accused the mayor of gambling in the casino with taxpayers money. 
The mayor was found to have issued the contracts illegally, without proper competition; to have taken out an 
illegal loan; and to have used council money to subsidise his football team. Local citizens had to pay an extra 
3,2% local income tax to rectify the municipal finances. 91 
 
5.7.3.2. France: first PPP cancelled by the court 
The first PPP contract signed under French legislation was annulled by a court ruling in 2008.  In 2005 the 
regional council of Loiret had invited tenders to build a college in Villemandeur, but no bids were received. 
The council then signed a PPP agreement, without further tendering, arguing that it was a matter of urgency 
to build the college: the contract was worth €21.7 m. Euros, €13.3m. for the construction and €8.4m. for 
managing the college for 10 years. The judge ruled that there was no urgency justifying a breach of the law 
on competitive tendering. 92 
 
5.7.3.3. Germany: Frankfurt schools problems 
In August 2007 Hochtief took over four additional schools in Frankfurt am Main.  This was surprising, given 
that the city had suffered a considerable debacle with its first PPP school project. The construction of the 
educational centre using conventional public procurement would have been €4million euros cheaper, 
according to an audit report.  For the next 20 years the contract with Hochtief requires € 12.1 million euros 
annually which would amount to between 17% and 36% of the total budget for school buildings in Frankfurt, 
leaving the remaining schools with very small. 93 
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5.7.3.4. Belgium: an IPPP returns to public ownership 
Aquafin was established in 1990 by the regional government of Flanders  to design, finance, build and 
operate all supramunicipal infrastructure needed to treat domestic wastewater and to optimise all main 
sewers and wastewater treatment plants. Aquafin is responsible for investments of up to €200m. per year, 
and the cost of the service is 50% financed through taxation.  It is regarded by the EIB as an ‗effective 
operator and contract machine‘. Aquafin also sells its expertise to authorities outside Flanders and to 
industrial clients on the Flemish market. Up to 2005 Aquafin was a PPP,  51% owned by  Severn Trent, one 
of the private English water companies.   
 
In 2005 the regional authority of Flanders bought out the private sector stake, so Aquafin is now 100% 
owned by the public sector. This was in response to a formal warning from the European Commission in 
2002 that the competition laws had not been complied with correctly when the Flemish government selected 
private shareholders in 1991, and that the work assigned to Aquafin was in breach of procurement laws.  
 
The return to public ownership has led to a significant reduction in the cost of capital because of the lower 
interest rates charged to the public sector. Aquafin now has the best possible credit rating because it reflects 
the credit rating of the regional government: ―When the Flemish Region received the very highest score for 
creditworthiness at the end of 2006, Aquafin‘s rating increased accordingly to the same AAA level.‖.  This 
has ―significantly reduced the margins on long-term commercial loans and on commercial paper issued. This 
advantage is passed on to the drinking water consumer‖. The Flemish government was however considering 
full privatisation of Aquafin in 2008. 94. 
 
5.7.4. Forcing reductions in other services 
The rigidity of the contractual obligations to PPPs can mean that the  spending of this money gets priority 
over other spending, even at the expense of services. The size of PPPs means that the potential displacement 
effect can be huge. In Portugal, the annual payments to just two major road PPPs cost €800million, are  
larger than the entire national transport budget of €700million.95 In the UK.. by February 2008, a total of 93 
deals had been signed for PFI projects in the national health service, for a total investment of just over of  
£10 billion.  The annual payments by NHS trusts to the PFI contractors continue for the next 38 years, 
peaking at £2billion per year in 2029, and total £57 billion.   
Chart D. Expenditure on PFI schemes in the NHS 












































Source: calculated from Treasury PFI projects list http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/documents/public_private_partnerships/ppp_pfi_stats.cfm  
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The sheer scale of PFI projects have been a factor in the emergence of deficits of a number of NHS hospital 
trusts. For the 18 trusts with major PFI schemes in operation in 2005/06, capital costs were 4.3% higher than 
the amount funded under the tariff. On average NHS trusts with PFI schemes were having to pay 8.3% of 
their total income in charges and other payments linked to the PFI – more than the 5.8% of income allocated 
to each trust for capital costs. This funding gap of 2.5% has to be covered by drawing on income intended to 
pay for services. 96 
 
The schemes result in large fixed expenditure for many years ahead, which cannot be adjusted in response to 
changing circumstances, and so transfer unforeseen risks onto that part of expenditure providing services : 
―many of the building projects impose costs that are not justified in terms of income under payment by  
results….. Trusts which have much less contracted expenditure – current as well as capital – are going to be 
much better placed in the near future to cope with the rigours of the reform agenda as it will be easier to 
adjust to variation in revenue.‖ 97 
 
The problems have been demonstrated at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital trust in Greenwich, which has a 
major PFI scheme, the costs of which rose to 11.3%, nearly double the government allocation for capital 
costs. A report by the strategic health authority warned that QEH and other local trusts in a similar situation 
would: ――incur recurrent [income/expenditure] and cash flow deficits even if they operate as efficiently as 
the average hospital trust in England. A high proportion of their underlying [income/expenditure] and cash 
flow deficits are attributable to this effect‖ 98 In 2007 the QEH announced cuts of around 10% in clinical 
services. 
 
PSIRU University of Greenwich                                                                                                                        www.psiru.org 
09/07/2010  Page 24 of 32  
  
 
6. The summary case of Metronet: learning from a failure. 
In 2007 one of the largest PFI schemes in the UK collapsed. Metronet was one of two PPPs used for 
maintenance and renewal of the London Underground system. It represented 1/6th of the total value of PFI 
schemes in the UK. These extracts from the parliamentary report on its failure highlight many of the issues 
covered in this report. 99 The strength of the recommendations should be noted not only in the UK but 
elsewhere. 
 
- ―The return anticipated by Metronet‘s shareholders appears to have been out of all proportion to the 
level of risk associated with the contract. The parent companies were effectively able to limit their 
liability to the £70 million they each invested in Metronet at the outset. …. In the face of this very 
limited liability it is difficult to lend any credence to the assertion that the Metronet PPP contracts were 
effective in transferring risk from the public to the private sector. In fact, the reverse is the case. 
Metronet‘s shareholders, had the company been operated effectively, stood to make quite extravagant 
returns. Now that it has failed, it is the taxpayer and the Tube passengers who must meet the cost.  
 
- ―In terms of borrowing, the Metronet contract did nothing more than secure loans, 95% of which were 
in any case underwritten by the public purse, at an inflated cost— the worst of both possible worlds….. 
If finance cannot be secured at reasonable terms without guaranteeing the vast majority of the debt, 
loans direct to the Government, which would enjoy the highest credit rating and significantly lower 
costs, would seem to be the more cost-effective option. 
 
- ―Metronet‘s inability to operate efficiently or economically proves that the private sector can fail to 
deliver on a spectacular scale, although Tube Lines‘ performance provides an example of private sector 
innovation and efficiency. The evidence is clear: it cannot be taken as given that private sector 
involvement in public projects will necessarily deliver innovation and efficiency, least of all if the 
contracts lack appropriate commercial incentives. Future assessments of the comparative value for 
money of private sector-managed models for infrastructure projects should not assume a substantial 
efficiency-savings factor; 
 
- ―We recommend that the Government, as a matter of urgency, make a full assessment of the additional 
costs that have been incurred as a result of the failure of Metronet— including the cost of work that has 
been inefficiently undertaken and the cost of administration. 
 
- ―The Government should not enter into any further PPP agreements without a comprehensive and 
accurate assessment of the level of risk transfer to the private sector and a firm idea of what would 
constitute an appropriate price for taking on such a level of risk. If it is not possible in reality to transfer 
a significant proportion of the risk away from the public purse, a simpler—and potentially cheaper—
public sector management model should seriously be considered. 
 
- ―The Government should bear the Metronet debacle in mind if and when its parent companies -Atkins, 
Balfour Beatty, Bombardier, EDF Energy, Thames Water - next come to bid for publicly-funded work.  
 
- ―The Government should remember the failure of Metronet before it considers entering into any similar 
arrangement again. It should remember that the private sector will never wittingly expose itself to 
substantial risk without ensuring that it is proportionally, if not generously rewarded. Ultimately, the 
taxpayer pays the price. 
 
- ―Whether or not the Metronet failure was primarily the fault of the particular companies involved, we 
are inclined to the view that the model itself was flawed and probably inferior to traditional public-
sector management. We can be more confident in this conclusion now that the potential for inefficiency 
and failure in the private sector has been so clearly demonstrated. In comparison, whatever the potential 
inefficiencies of the public sector, proper public scrutiny and the opportunity of meaningful control is 
likely to provide superior value for money. Crucially, it also offers protection from catastrophic failure. 
It is worth remembering that when private companies fail to deliver on large public projects they can 
walk away—the taxpayer is inevitably forced to pick up the pieces.‖ 
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